|
The GLWQA review
|
|
Synthesis of Public Comment >
Effectiveness
Participants were asked whether they thought the Agreement is working, and three questions were used to probe for responses:
- Is the Agreement helping to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Great Lakes? If not, why not?
- In which situations does the Agreement fall short? Which parts of the Agreement have worked well and which have not?
- What do you think about how governments have been implementing the Agreement? Is there anything else they could or should be doing?
Perceived successes and failures
Lack of progress in restoring Areas of Concern
Effectiveness of the International Joint Commission
Failure to act and anticipate
Other suggestions
Perceived Successes and Failures
There was widespread support for the Agreement, which was seen as a successful binational vehicle for management strategies around focused issues. Said one state environmental official: "The Agreement has had positive results in such areas as the development of Remedial Action Plans and Lakewide Management Plans, which, as directed under Annex 2, provide for a systematic and comprehensive ecosystem approach to restoring and protecting beneficial uses in Areas of Concern and in open-lake waters." Other products of the Agreement were said to include identification of the need to control persistent toxic substances and deal with contaminated sediments, and the development of programs to address such issues.
Many other people agreed with this assessment, as the following comments illustrate:
The Water Quality Agreement should be recognized for what it is and what it has accomplished, a fine and eloquent statement of environmental consciousness, a discrete tool and guide for the Governments to maintain chemical integrity, and a commitment to cooperation across borders that transcends our national interests and seeks to promote health, vitality and democracy to all people by protecting a scarce natural resource on which we rely for so much.
What I want to speak about is the success of some of these cleanup efforts because we've noticed a lot of hawks, falcons and eagles back in the area. Fish habitats are quite stable in the area. The fishermen are pulling out their quotas of fish ... and they're relatively clean fish; you're not seeing what you would have seen in the past. I'm pretty happy with seeing the re-introduction of these predatory birds in the region. It's a good indicator that things are cleaning up, and you guys deserve to know that.
Clearly, the phosphorous cleanup of the Great Lakes was the greatest achievement of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. Moreover, the Agreement effectively focused attention on the broad subject of persistent bioaccumulative toxics.
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement has been an important force in moving both Lake Ontario and the Great Lakes ... toward restoration of beneficial uses.
|
Based on these successes, many people hold high hopes that a revised Agreement will continue to facilitate improvements in the future:
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was born as a reactive document, responding to what was then considered the imminent death of Lake Erie. The Agreement and laws in the U.S. and Canada swung into action and helped reverse that process. We still have a lot more work to do to restore damage. As such, the next generation of the Agreement should be used to inspire coordinated restoration campaigns in the U.S. and Canada.
Virtual elimination, zero discharge in the existing Agreement forced us to really try and figure out new solutions to how to deal with toxics. Now we need to make sure that we continue in that way. We need to be thinking of the Water Quality Agreement as something that will work for us for the coming 20 years and, therefore, it must be very forward thinking and very leading-edge in terms of what we do with it.
|
Most participants, though, shared the view that there should have been much more success over the life of the Agreement. In a written submission, one Waterkeeper argued that, "the reason the objectives of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement have not yet been met is because the Agreement has been poorly implemented. We do not believe there is a fundamental flaw with the document."
Many pointed to the fact that only two Areas of Concern have so far been delisted, that some problems persist despite the efforts to date, and some problems have hardly been addressed, if at all. As one expert, a former senior federal government official, put it during the Web dialogue:
Unfortunately, the concept of virtual elimination of the discharge of [persistent bioaccumulative] toxics morphed into a virtual elimination approach to all toxics themselves, as well as a zero discharge approach, both of which mired the Agreement in controversy and hostile opposition in many quarters. This, in part, contributed to the gridlock over the AOCs/RAPs [Areas of Concern and Remedial Action Plans]. The perfect became the enemy of the possible. Finally, the Agreement did not take a broad ecosystem approach which truly addressed the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Great Lakes. Rather, it was viewed as merely an ecosystem approach in the service of chemical reductions. Thus, issues like aquatic invasive species, flow regime disruption, habitat loss and land use were largely overlooked.
|
The chair of one environmental organization was equally forthright: "From our perspective in the past few years, despite very fine words - and I applaud the language in the document - we believe that it has failed:"
There is little evidence that the federal Government of the United States is committed to restoring water quality. I confess I know less about the commitment of the Government of Canada. There is little evidence that business and industry are responding to legacy contamination and that citizens are better educated to the impact of wetlands on water quality and the government more prepared to protect them.
|
Another environmental organization was also concerned:
I think the lack of progress on the most key principle, which is virtual elimination in the Great Lakes, is the major failure of the Agreement. In fact, we pioneered this principle in the Great Lakes, and other regions have taken it and run with it and integrated it into their programs, like the REACH program in Europe [European Union regulatory framework for the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals] that requires the substitution of safer chemicals for ones known to be harmful. And we have virtually eliminated virtual elimination. We've made very little progress on getting rid of chemicals that we know are in the Great Lakes, but also on the 20,000 chemicals that are added each year to our environment.
|
Some, however, were more tempered in their remarks about the effectiveness of the Agreement. "I can't think of any rivers that have caught fire in my lifetime," said one outdoors enthusiast. "I have actually canoed on the upper Cuyahoga, which is the one that caught fire, and it was quite lovely. But tern species going extinct, continuing problems, unknowns going into the future - I would say that the Agreement is succeeding, not succeeded."
Lack of Progress in Restoring Areas of Concern (AOCs)
Regarding the topic of effectiveness, Remedial Action Plans attracted the most attention and were often used as examples of shortcomings in Agreement implementation: "They were probably the source of greatest hope for visible, tangible improvement on an AOC-by-AOC level," said one retired government official who is still active in environmental issues. "Over 15 years later, with no delistings on the U.S. side and only two on the Canadian side, there is much disappointment."
Many questions were raised in connection with Remedial Action Plans (RAPs). "Is the concept of RAPs fundamentally flawed?" asked one participant. "Did we not invest enough money? Were they not high priority enough? Did they not fit with other programs? Did we not manage them effectively enough? Were the local government people not involved enough?" Overall, insufficient funding, bureaucratization, inadequate or ineffective public participation, and a lack of accountability provisions were the factors most often cited in the public meetings, during the Web dialogue and in written submissions:
My view is that the RAPs and AOCs have evolved from being initially effective to now being bogged down in bureaucracy. There is this plan and that plan, and this evaluation and that evaluation - meanwhile, there are no water, sediment, fish tissue and aviary samples for literally the past ten years.
Virtually every time a study showed impairment due to pollution, habitat loss, beach closings, etc., the person responsible for the impairment would ask for another study to delay remediation or try to shift the responsibility onto someone else. What do the citizens of both countries have to show for all of this? Millions of taxpayer dollars wasted, millions of cubic feet of polluted water still flowing ... and acres of our precious wetlands are still being turned into developments.
The underlying cause is money. Governments cannot allocate the large sums needed for remediation over long enough periods to assign competent people to the task at hand. Many individuals must participate in too many programs to ensure some will be funded. They spend too much time seeking partners and funding. Too much worrying, submitting projects, sharing resources, report presentations, etc. In our RAP, it took forever to decide whether to dredge, then where to dredge to what concentration, and then how to dredge, only to decide not to dredge.
Citizen input in the process has dwindled and coordinators want volunteers to keep up with the paper work. Public and political awareness of priorities for what needs to be done is lost. While some projects muddle along, they are picked up because they have some interest. Others, that may benefit the water more, go unaddressed - especially in the core urban areas where the political will is tough to come by.
|
Overall, there was widespread frustration that progress in remediation has been slow, that problems apparent when the 1987 Protocol was put in place continue to persist. "We've been to dozens if not hundreds of meetings on the Fox River cleanup, and yet the process is just dragging along, dragging," said one participant. Others spoke in a similar vein with respect to Areas of Concern in general: "We need action on this. We need a sense of urgency from the IJC, from the U.S. federal Government, from the Government in Canada, pushing for these sites to be cleaned up."
A general view, too, was that a number of important issues have not been addressed. Many of them were proposed for inclusion in a revised Agreement (see section below on Scope), but they were also cited as evidence that the Agreement has not been nearly as effective as it could have been.
Effectiveness of the International Joint Commission
In similar fashion, some of the criticisms expressed during the public meetings, and in the Web dialogue as well, were directed at the Commission. One participant, making a point that was shared by others, noted that the 1987 Protocol gives the Commission responsibilities to review and evaluate progress under the Agreement:
The Commission must take seriously this responsibility to review and evaluate. It should not be simply viewed as a general responsibility to review and comment. To be effective, review and evaluation must be rigorous, quantitative, measurable, accountable, relevant, well-grounded in practical experience and value-added ... . In essence, the Commission needs to fulfill its role and responsibility like the U.S. Government Accountability Office fulfills its role and responsibility.
|
Comments were also made about the potential for the Commission to be more active in implementing the Agreement. "For example," one wrote during the Web dialogue, "the Commission could assist the Governments on Remedial Action Plan and Lakewide Mangement Plan issues (e.g., delisting targets, best management practices, sediment remediation technologies, habitat rehabilitation techniques, benefits assessment, etc.) and help measure and celebrate progress." This individual argued that the Agreement makes the Commission a legitimate leader in the Great Lakes basin ecosystem and that the Governments welcome its assistance and advice. "Therefore," he concluded, "the Commission must clearly assume with more vigor the important role that they have been given for RAPs and LaMPs."
Failure to Act and Anticipate
Many people pointed to those responsible for implementing the Agreement, not to the Agreement itself, in order to explain failures or shortcomings. "Overall, the present language of the Agreement very clearly tells us what we need to do," said one participant. "The Agreement can be looked at as tools, and the tools will help the artist to excel, but you can't blame the tools for the failure of the artist."
A member of a binational organization that was participating in a study of Remedial Action Plan achievements reported a finding that Governments are generally blamed for shortcomings: "A theme that's really come out very quickly already is people saying to us that a major part of why the implementation of the Agreement goes up and down is the failure of the Governments to consistently support the process."
The spokesperson for an environmental group agreed with this assessment: "I think the failures of the Governments to act on the goals and on the recommendations that the IJC has made are key, and also the diminishment of public involvement over time."
In another part of the basin, a union representative took the same position: "For the most part, it's still a fantastic Agreement. What we need, however, is a commitment on behalf of the Canadian and American Governments to be serious about implementing the Agreement."
Many participants proffered government decisions at all levels as examples of what they described as diminishing commitment to the Agreement's call for zero discharge and virtual elimination of persistent toxic substances3:
Just recently, we learned of a permit issued to one of our local paper mills that allows a 10,000 pound increase in their discharge of phosphorous and an increase in their mercury releases. And it is being permitted! This is clear degradation. We're moving in the wrong direction with some of these permits and we need to stop it.
Zero discharge is not happening. And, with that, enforcement is not taking place.
We need to reinforce and reemphasize the Agreement's call for zero discharge of toxic substances or the virtual elimination of [persistent] toxic problems in the Great Lakes.
At least in the case of the U.S., we're going backwards. A 2003 report by the Associated Press found that three-quarters of the nation's largest 6,500 industrial and sewer plants violated their permits with little fear of punishment. The result for the Great Lakes, according to state and federal agencies, is a six-year increase in toxic water pollution.
Despite a Congressional request for a mercury control strategy in 1990, no strategy is forthcoming. Mercury ... plagues both the Great Lakes and Michigan's inland lakes, with fish consumption advisories existing in every location.
I'd like to encourage you and to urge you to push forward to continue in advancing zero discharge goals, both by reviewing old strategies to see what has worked and will continue to work, and to look and see what hasn't worked and what needs to be reinvigorated or new strategies developed. The calling for zero discharge cannot be weakened in any way.
|
Echoing a theme heard from many participants, the executive director of a large regional environmental group said that the Agreement needs to be preventative of future problems, not just reactive to existing ones. "For example, we knew that the zebra mussel was about ready to enter the Great Lakes long before it ever did. There's no reason that we couldn't have and shouldn't have stopped that threat, which we now know is costing probably hundreds of millions of dollars to us as taxpayers."
In fact, the presence of invasive species was the most frequent example of the Agreement's failure to anticipate and respond to threats:
The biological integrity of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem is under siege of 'terrorist' invasive species that the Agreement was supposed to prevent, and all levels of government are responsible. ... International ships with invasive species-contaminated ballast water should have been prevented from entering our Great Lakes water system by being forced to unload their cargoes at a 'sea' port. ... The Water Quality Agreement lacks proactive, enforceable regulations that could be used to prevent future invasions.
Zebra mussels were first documented in the Great Lakes in 1987, and yet we are still haggling over how to comprehensively prevent future invasions.
|
For the most part, responsibility for the Agreement's failures was seen to rest with governments, especially the two federal Governments. However, many people also pointed to the other levels of government as well.
A common view was that shortfalls in progress can be attributed, in part, to a lack of accountability provisions in the Agreement, such as timelines, milestones, deadlines and responsibilities and other ways to measure performance: "The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement offers tremendous potential in serving as a blue print or a roadmap for the long-term protection and restoration of this vital, vulnerable and irreplaceable resource," wrote one participant in the Web dialogue. "But it can only meet its full potential if it includes stronger mechanisms for accountability and enforcement, which can help keep progress moving through changes in political administrations and the ebb and flow of public and political will."
Many others agreed with this assessment. "First, it [the Agreement] can and should include very specific goals, objectives and timelines, and it should be clear about which entity is responsible for implementing the various pieces of the Agreement," wrote another participant in the Web dialogue. "That would enable the IJC to be more specific in measuring the progress of the U.S. and Canada in implementing the Agreement and holding them accountable." Enforcement rules, mechanisms to sue the federal Governments, and more transparency to and engagement of the public were among the provisions recommended for inclusion in a revised Agreement. So was including deadlines for eliminating municipal and industrial pollution in Articles VI of the Agreement.
Other Suggestions
Other proposals were put forward for increasing the effectiveness of the Agreement, often from technical experts. For example, the head of a municipal water division suggested that a modified or revised Agreement could contain the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) approach used in food and drug manufacturing. "HACCP manages biological, physical and chemical risks, and permits defining environmental, health and esthetical impacts," he noted.
Another suggestion came from someone who recalled the reference to "Compatible Regulations" in Article 1(e) of the Agreement4 and said this defined a principle that should be applied to other relevant agreements and environmental regulations: "To ensure that compatible and consistent approaches to environmental effectiveness occur across the basin, GLNPO [U.S. EPA's Great Lakes National Program Office] should certify all sections of the Water Resources Development Act for the Great Lakes in compliance with Annex 2 of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement5 and the principle of 'Compatible Regulations' under the Coastal Zone Management Act."
Updating the list of Areas of Concern was also proposed by some participants, who felt that the Agreement is too rigid and, hence, does not facilitate funding for other areas that require action. For example:
I'd like to see the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement with at least some flexibility in the future to look not only at issues of concern and objectives, setting objectives, but also Areas of Concern that may be changing, so that we don't have necessarily a situation where there's funding being channeled to one Area of Concern and then we somehow remediate that, and then we see, just further up the road, that we're emerging with a new Area of Concern but it can't be addressed through the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
|
3 Article II of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement states it is the policy of the Governments that: "The discharge of toxic substances in toxic amounts be prohibited and the discharge of any or all persistent toxic substances be virtually eliminated." Annex 12 states that: "The philosophy adopted for control of inputs of persistent toxic substances shall be zero discharge."
4 Article I(e) of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement states: "'Compatible regulations' means regulations no less restrictive than the agreed principles set out in this Agreement."
5 Annex 2 of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement defines Remedial Action Plans and Lakewide Management Plans.
Last update:
|
